

Responsibility for Peace and War
in the Pacific

BY

HENRY F. ANGUS

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PART IV B

RESPONSIBILITY FOR PEACE AND WAR IN
THE PACIFIC

By HENRY F. ANGUS, *University of British Columbia*


THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS AND ITS METHODS

One of the aims of those who founded the Institute of Pacific Relations eight years ago was to promote mutual knowledge and mutual understanding between the citizens of the nations in the Pacific Area in such a way that any circumstances likely to lead to violent conflicts between them might be subjected, at the earliest possible stage, to friendly discussion of a franker and more scientific character than discussions in which governments participate. It was hoped that the use of this novel method of international intercourse would be effective in preventing the occurrence in the Pacific Area of those bitter conflicts between nation and nation which have been the despair of those who have at heart the moral and material welfare of mankind.

The Institute has held meetings every two years and the new technique which its founders had in mind has been patiently and steadily developed. Among those who have attended the meetings the last remnants of suspicion have been dissipated and the most friendly relations have been established. The constant reliance on scientific research for facts, and on recognized experts for opinions, has tended to dissociate from the discussion of international questions any element of bargaining. And those who have attended conferences have done their utmost to spread throughout the communities from which they come the knowledge which they have acquired and the spirit which animates the Institute. But it is unhappily not now a mere question of avoiding dangers — positive action is needed if safety is to be attained.

GENERAL IDEAS ABOUT PEACE AND WAR

No people wants war as such. Wars are not arranged like football matches in America or student duels in Germany. But no people wants peace so much as to be prepared to sacrifice all other considerations in order to maintain it. A people that did would be



generally despised. This fact is widely recognized. The phrase "too proud to fight" has never been a success. Covenants to renounce war contain an implicit exception for the case of self-defense. This exception can be widened so as to make the covenant meaningless if we go on to say that self-defense means the defense of any interest which we choose to consider vital. Even without this cynical display of logic we must in mere fairness make self-defense include self-preservation. It is possible, of course, to believe that no nation will ever be obliged to fight in self-defense unless some other nation has been unduly aggressive; and to believe that no nation will ever be obliged to fight for self-preservation. But even if these beliefs are justified (which is doubtful) it would be foolish to derive much comfort from them. To prove that war is unlikely one would have to hold much more daring beliefs—one would have to think that no nation can ever be persuaded that its safety is endangered by the act of another, that no nation can ever be persuaded that some act is necessary for its welfare which will appear unduly aggressive to another, that no nation can be led to think that its self-preservation requires the use of force. There are many who do not hold these beliefs but who do think that discussion can do a great deal to prevent misunderstandings. They would not be prepared to back discussion as a winner in a short-distance event against the massive emotional propaganda with which at times it is forced to compete.

There is a second sort of optimism which must be repudiated. It is usual to point to the fact that private warfare—of which duelling is taken as the example—has been eliminated, and to argue that it is not difficult to apply the same methods of elimination to warfare between nations, so that resort to the courts will replace resort to the battle field. This reasoning is fallacious. The fallacy lies in generalizing from a single example. Duelling is private warfare for a matter of honor. It has disappeared. So perhaps may international warfare for matters of honor, though I am not sure that many people were not happier to think that they were fighting for a scrap of paper than to think that they were fighting for material objectives. To kill for gain seems sordid!

But there is such a thing as private warfare for material interests, and where it has been suppressed, the suppression has not been entirely through the use of the courts. What happens when, within the limits of a single state, some group or class has felt itself oppressed? (The reason may be, for instance, that some other group controls the bulk of the land or the bulk of the capital and makes an unreasonable charge for its use.) More and more urgently the aggrieved group presents its demands. It does not take them to the courts, for the courts would invariably protect the recognized legal


rights of the possessing groups. The demands are presented not to courts but to legislatures. What is demanded is not the enforcement of existing rights but the creation of new rights. These new rights will benefit one group by curtailing the existing rights of other groups. If the legislative process works with reasonable efficiency there is no question of resort to private warfare. If the legislature is unresponsive there may be minor outbreaks which are repressed. If it never acts there may be revolution. It is not duelling but revolt or revolution within a country which is the counterpart of war. Civil war is the counterpart of international war. But it is less frequent because there is the possibility of meeting new situations by peaceful legislative changes. This method has no international counterpart. The method which has minimized—though it has not eliminated—civil warfare, has not yet been applied to international warfare. It could be applied only by the creation of an international legislature which could speak the language of command to states hitherto obedient to no command. In geological time the establishment of such a super-state may be “just round the corner.” In historical time it is probably several centuries away. These are conjectures. The certainty is that a super-state is not an immediate possibility.

THE CRITICAL POSITION OF JAPAN

It is with these general ideas before us that we should consider the central fact of the Pacific Area: the economic situation of Japan.

In the last fifty years Japan has westernized her economic life and has profoundly altered her cultural life as well. Westernization has brought a great advance in material well-being. The advance has taken place with a speed that is almost incredible. And Japan has appeared to be on the threshold of prosperity, in the Western sense of that word. In a peaceful and (we must add) a reasonable world, there lies a most promising economic future before Japan.

But even if we were to assume that the world is peaceful, the most rashly optimistic would hardly venture to call it reasonable. And Japan's economic future is beset with dangers which must be a source of incessant anxiety to her leaders. The population of Japan, which had been practically stationary for the two centuries of the Tokugawa Shogunate, began to increase rapidly as Japan “westernized.” There was nothing surprising in this phenomenon. It had occurred in all countries which had passed through the process of industrialization. The birth rate in Japan, for instance, never rose so high as the English birth rate of the middle of the nineteenth



century. And the fertility of Japanese marriages has begun to recede, exactly as has happened in other countries. If, for the time being, the rate of increase has remained high, it is because the rapid expansion of the population has left the proportion of women of childbearing age much higher than in countries with a stationary population. In time this condition will correct itself and it can be predicted with reasonable certainty that the population of Japan will eventually become stationary. This sober calculation is one of the contributions of research to the discussions of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

But the sober calculation which banishes exaggerated fears nevertheless discloses a dangerous situation. The present population of sixty-five million may be expected to approach ninety million. As numbers become stationary the proportion of children will decrease and the proportion of the population for whom work must be found will increase. The employment problem will become more difficult than it has ever been before.

What is to happen to this growing population? The increasing numbers who will have to enter economic life during the next fifteen years are already born. There is nothing problematical about their existence. Birth control clinics cannot reduce their numbers. Only disease or famine or murder could do so.

It does not seem likely that greater numbers can derive their living from agriculture and allied occupations. Indeed, it is probable that the numbers already on the land are excessive, and that their per capita income would be higher if the numbers were smaller. The average area per laborer is from our Western standpoint incredibly low, and the production per acre almost incredibly high. There is little or no room for expansion. New methods may make new areas cultivable, but these areas are not likely to support a large population.

It seems probable that the agricultural classes would already have met with disaster but for the rapid progress of silk-raising as a subsidiary industry. The profits from this occupation, with its immense labor requirements, have offset the uneconomical subdivision of the land. Of the importance of silk in Japan's foreign trade I shall speak in a few minutes. So far as foreign trade is concerned it might conceivably be replaced by rayon. But as an item in the farmer's budget it is harder to replace. The future of the silk industry depends on American women continuing to prefer silk to other textiles, including rayon. Should a cautious Japanese economist say with the experienced Frenchman, *Souvent femme varie, fol est qui s'y fie?* For on the future of the silk industry depends the future of the Japanese farmer. Almost literally he is hanging by a

thread — a silken thread. An expansion of this industry seems very improbable. Rayon competition has already been mentioned. There is also the possibility of Chinese competition in silk production; the possibility of changes of taste among consumers.

If, then, occupations are to be found for the increasing population, it is to industry that Japan must turn. A hundred years ago England was able to meet her population problem by emigration (which is out of the question for Japan) and by industrialization. England did not have to press the cultivation of her land beyond the point of diminishing returns. In a peaceful and reasonable world industrialization would be very easy. Japan would be a large buyer of raw materials, particularly of iron and coal, and an exporter of highly finished manufactured goods. She would become rich, and so would the landlord countries which sold her raw materials and foodstuffs. There are many countries ready and willing to supply these things: Canada, Australia, India, Russia, and many others. There is no danger of a shortage. Physically the increase in Japanese population need not be an economic danger either to Japan or to other countries.

There are difficulties, however, which are not physical. The countries that are ready to sell meat and milk, wheat and wool, iron and coal, want to be paid and they think in terms of money payment. But Japan is not a great producer of gold. If Japan is to pay in money she must obtain the money by selling her exports. It is the old story of goods and services with which war-debt discussions have made us familiar. What goods and services does Japan sell? Her principal export is raw silk to the United States. This constitutes 40 per cent of her export trade. It is not likely to expand. It is at the mercy of the American tariff, at the mercy of the caprice of American women, and for that matter at the mercy of a pacifist boycott.

The next export in order of importance is a manufacture — cotton. The chief market is China. This export therefore is vulnerable to a Chinese boycott, or to a Chinese protective tariff. Other markets, Malaya, India, Africa, are equally vulnerable. Countries wishing to take the first step in industrialization usually begin with a tariff on cotton yarn and coarse cotton. Within the British Empire a preferential tariff for the benefit of Great Britain is common.

Other manufactures might develop — as, for instance, rayon has developed. They are exposed to similar dangers. Japan's economic peril is that she may be compelled by her growing population to become industrial and to rely on foreign countries for food and raw materials while at the same time the protective policies of these countries prevent Japan from acquiring the money with which to



pay for the food and raw materials. Quite simply the same sort of policy which has made it impossible for the United States to collect war debts might cause the economic destruction of Japan. A tariff blockade might strangle Japan as a naval blockade strangled Germany fifteen years ago.

We must remember that a nation's tariff has hitherto been thought of as its own business. To raise a tariff is not a hostile act. Japan could not appeal to an international court for redress. She would be told that other nations were only doing what they were perfectly entitled to do. Courts, we have seen, protect established rights. There is no international legislature to which she can appeal. Her only appeal is to bargaining. She can say to Australia, "I can buy your wool but only if you will buy my silk or my pottery." This method has been used in negotiation with India. But for bargaining Japan is less well placed than England, who buys more than she sells. Or Japan can cut her prices either directly or by depreciating her currency, as indeed she has already done. But in this case tariff retaliation is the probable outcome.

It is worth emphasizing that this need of Japan for markets if she is to obtain the money—or the foreign exchange—with which to pay for essential imports is quite different in character from the desire of capitalist countries in general for markets that will enable them to dispose of a surplus production, for which consumers cannot be found at home, and so to enlarge the scale of their productive industries. Japan's need for iron and coal is a basic need which exists independently of whether the economic system of Japan is capitalistic or communistic. It follows that Japan's need for foreign markets in which she can obtain the means of paying for her imports is also a basic need independent of her economic system. Indeed, we find the same need of selling something in order to obtain the wherewithal to pay for essential imports in the case of the U.S.S.R. as Canadians realize to their sorrow when Russia sells timber or wheat. Japan too is forced to sell on disadvantageous terms, but the goods she offers on the markets of the world are silk and manufactured products. The manufactured products are things that other countries can make for themselves if they choose.

Now let us put ourselves in imagination in the position of Japanese statesmen. What are we going to do to insure the economic future of our country? How are we going to "blast our way into the markets of the world"? Other countries have acquired political control of the land they need, and of the sources of raw material essential to their well-being. But they were at liberty to use methods which are now forbidden. Is it worth asking whether they feel under any obligation to share the spoils with the newcomer, now that they

have forbidden the newcomer to help himself? For Japan to ask the question would be to court a humiliating reply and a reputation for aggressiveness. Is it safe to rely on some countries at least being willing to trade on reasonable terms? If not Australia, then Canada or India or Russia? Or is the safest course to make the most of the rights acquired before the closed season was introduced — the rights in Manchuria. At least if these rights are in danger is it not a matter of self-preservation to maintain them?

Manchuria can be mentioned very briefly, for the situation there is well known. Given security and economic freedom, political control is in no way necessary for Japan. And the good will of China is important to Japan because of trade with China. The solution proposed in the Lytton report is to recognize and in a measure guarantee what are considered Japan's legitimate interests, and to insist on measures tending toward the economic restoration of China. China is prepared to accept these terms. Why should not Japan do so too?

The answer seems to be that Japan has committed herself to the recognition of the new state and, roughly speaking, to a policy of self-help. As regards her obligations as a member of the League of Nations she has no doubt acted quite wrongly.

But too much should not be made of Japan's having repudiated a treaty obligation, or at least insisted on interpreting her obligations in her own way. In effect Japan has introduced into the covenant renouncing war an exception for an act of self-preservation, and has made herself sole judge of whether a case of self-preservation exists. We live at a time when governments are being constantly urged to repudiate their agreements in the supposed interests of expediency. Governments are urged, for instance, to repudiate their bonded debts, to devalue their currency, to reduce the rate of interest on their debt by a unilateral act, or to give priority to other expenditures, e. g., "babies before bonds," in the phrase of the Australian politician. These acts, indefensible from the standpoint of rigid standards of honesty, find their alleged justification not in self-preservation but in expediency. Only those of you who have never listened with sympathy to such arguments are entitled to condemn Japan for acting illegally.

It is, however, quite possible to hold that Japan acted not only illegally but also unwisely. This is the view of many foreign critics and probably of many Japanese liberals. An important reservation must be made. The reservation is this: What Japan did may have been politically inevitable. For instance, it is possible to believe that the American NRA is a most unwise measure and yet to say that the federal government was wise in choosing it as the least of the

possible evils, given the state of public opinion and the temper of Congress. That is, to believe that while America as a whole was foolish, the government was wise. The same sort of reasoning may be applied to Japan. We may hold that the Japanese nation has been foolish and yet think the government wise.

It was very natural for a party of action to arise in Japan, for liberal statesmen to be thrust into the background, and for the army rather than the politician to command the support of the rural population. All this does not amount to more or less than saying that Japan's action was politically unavoidable in the sense in which the refusal of the United States to enter the League of Nations or to accept a settlement of war debts is politically unavoidable. Many Americans who deplore these things are quick to explain their political necessity.

THE DILEMMA OF OTHER NATIONS

The result of all this is to create a situation of a most deplorable character. Any attempt to coerce Japan, as, for example, by an international boycott which would cut off her markets for silk and cotton and rapidly impoverish the country, would be quite likely to provoke a blind, passionate war of self-preservation which would lead actually to self-destruction; a war which the West would win, no doubt, but to what purpose? The West would have vindicated its right to refuse to trade with Japan—a right of nonintercourse, which, ironically enough, the West has in the past fought to prevent Japan or China from exercising. With what heart would you be ready to fight in such a war or send your sons to fight? Even if, with all the power of mass psychology, it were represented as a war to preserve the League of Nations and the peace treaties, as a war to end war. In the West it might, honestly enough, be thought of as a war for these purposes. And yet it would be bad, because it would be a bad way of accomplishing these purposes. For there is a better way and a safer way, *if it is politically possible in Western countries.*

A war with Japan would be bad for another reason as well. It would be condemned in advance to utter futility. No doubt the Western countries would win the war and would be free not to trade with Japan. But there is enough humane or philanthropic sentiment in the Western countries to make it impossible for them to leave a beaten people condemned by a tariff blockade to live on the verge of starvation. The Western countries would find that victory had simply transferred Japan's problem to their shoulders. They would have to try to build up in their own markets a place



for Japanese exports, not in order to collect an indemnity or to collect war debts but to save Japanese civilization from extinction. One may give up hope of collecting an indemnity, one may create conditions which make defaults inevitable, and give vent to one's dissatisfaction by abusing one's debtors, but one cannot refuse an appeal to mere humanity which is reinforced by the wish of important sections of one's own people to sell cotton, foodstuffs, or iron. Victory would thus create in an abominable way—through warfare—almost precisely the situation which common sense, as we shall see, might create tomorrow.

But the course which unfortunately the West is most likely to follow is to let China suffer heavily for the fear that the economic policy of the Western countries has aroused in Japan, and at the same time to abuse Japan as the villain of the piece. Only the excuse of ignorance can save such a course from the reproach of cynical hypocrisy. This excuse of ignorance is open to peoples—it is not open to statesmen.

There is, however, another course which is theoretically possible, which is sound and honorable, which is full of promise and hope for the future, but which as has been indicated may be beyond the bounds of political possibility. Let us examine it briefly.

The nations of the world might agree to "economic disarmament" and might voluntarily recognize some mutual duties in the matter of tariffs. They might recognize that their insistence on the control of immigration carries with it the obligation to allow, and even facilitate, the trade necessary for the existence in their homeland of the populations which are excluded. This recognition might be coupled with a condition that the goods exported in payment should be produced under living conditions and at rates of wages which should steadily approach those of the Western countries. Measures of this character would create a new world order based on the voluntary cooperation for mutual advantage of sovereign states, with the understanding that the claims of the states poor in natural resources would receive appropriate consideration. What is being suggested is nothing less than philosophical anarchy or "mutual aid" in international relations; and, men and women being what they are, the idea may be as hopelessly utopian as philosophical anarchy in civic affairs.

But so long as we, in the West, leave this policy unattempted and this offer unmade, we are not in a position to condemn Japan for the invasion of China without in some measure condemning ourselves as well. Yet we must face the fact that such an offer, while in no degree unreasonable, would be politically very difficult to make. To carry it out would quite definitely injure a number of



protected interests in the countries which undertook it, for some of their industries would be received and replaced by Japanese industries. It is true that, nationally speaking, this loss might be more than offset by expansion in some of their export industries. But the loss of employment would be more visible than the gain of employment. And the loss to invested capital would be more conspicuous than the gain to other industries. Nor would it be easy to arrange for compensation. Politically speaking, opposition to a proposal is much more likely to succeed than a novel proposal, however reasonable in itself.

Let me illustrate this point from two Canadian examples. To give the vote in British Columbia to the small number of men and women of Oriental race born in Canada would be a courteous and conciliatory act toward great neighbors across the Pacific. From a domestic standpoint it would be a mere act of sanity. An unenfranchised population is bound to become discontented and embittered. Canadians must aim at making their country one in which the descendants of the present population can live in peace and friendship. To terminate the abuse of taxation without representation might rank as a liberal principle, and to champion the cause of interracial and international friendship can hardly be at variance with the policy of the C. C. F. But no statement was made in the recent provincial action advocating this reform, which would do no more than bring Canada in this matter to the same level as the United States.

The other example concerns a matter of federal competence. Canadians continue to maintain a separate immigration act for one single race and to impose peculiar disabilities on the Chinese alone. To put Chinese in the same position as the Japanese and to bring them under the general immigration act without insulting discrimination would involve nothing or little more than admitting merchants and tourists and allowing seventy-five wives and children of Chinese men resident in Canada to enter the country each year. But this action is "politically impossible."

I have preferred to take examples from a small nation and to select examples not directly related to the mentality of a capitalistic system. My thesis is that the responsibility for the maintenance of peace and the avoidance of war is not satisfied by signing treaties of arbitration and of renunciation of war but that it requires a persistent will to peace whose symptoms lie in a steady avoidance of acts or policies either offensive in form or wantonly injurious in content. But this is anticipating. We must next turn to a contemporary development of very great significance.



NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICIES

Within each nation there are conflicts of economic interest as real, as severe, and often as bitter as any international economic conflict. But each nation is politically organized for the settlement of these conflicts. It has its constitution, its government, its legislature. It is able to make adjustments, and only on rare occasions do conflicts of economic interest lead to civil war or to revolution. Usually they are settled peacefully, although they may be settled unjustly or even cruelly.

Thus the Australian sheep-raiser has been forced by a tariff to subsidize the industrial community; French industries have been forced to subsidize the cultivation of wheat; the urban population of New Zealand has been forced by deliberate exchange depreciation to pay what amounts to a bounty on exports of butter and mutton; the South African negro has to submit to a color bar; the Australian sugar-grower receives an enormous bounty. This list is interminable. A recent example of an internal adjustment undertaken on a large scale with little regard for its international repercussions is the American NRA.

Indeed, the settlement of these internal differences frequently produces or intensifies the international rivalries which appear at times as a menace to peaceful international relations. Thus the Japanese buyer of Australian wool cannot pay with Japanese manufactures; Canada cannot pay for French wine with Canadian wheat; Denmark had to depreciate her currency in order to compete with New Zealand butter; and so on. When international economic conflicts develop there is no legislature to which they can be taken for adjustment. Nations whose vital interests are imperiled can obtain no relief which involves any interference with the sovereign rights of other nations. The strain which is thus placed on international good will may be intolerable. And if a crash occurs, there is a sense in which those nations whose domestic policies have led to the tension are *responsible* for the wars that may ensue, even though they themselves may not be directly involved.

The reason for conduct which appears inconsiderate and on occasion brutally reckless is not hard to find. We have taken examples from many countries. We might have taken them from almost any country. For in democratic countries governments are chosen, in undemocratic countries governments are tolerated, precisely because of their ability to deal with internal economic conflicts. Access to office and tenure of office depend on this test. It matters little enough whether the economic conflicts have been settled by making the international situation worse. There is no use in complaining




about this state of affairs. There is no chance of its being otherwise. What political leader can one think of who would not consider it a perfect answer to a demand for conciliatory international action if he could say: "What you ask is reasonable. I, personally, should like to do what you ask. A few people like yourself want it very strongly. Perhaps more than half of the electorate would approve though it is not important to them. But there is a well-organized minority which is strongly opposed, and the plain fact is that I could not expect to remain in office if I did what you ask." He would hardly think it necessary to add, "And therefore I refuse." A man who spoke in this way would be classed as frank and straightforward rather than as cowardly and venal.

It is by such paths as this that we come to the fatal doctrine that each nation should import only those things which it cannot make for itself except at an outrageous cost. For such a doctrine, expensive as its application may be, does seem to make for internal harmony. But it is none the less a fatal doctrine. Consider the position of a country which must import things which it cannot produce itself and which can offer in payment only things which its neighbors can produce if they wish. If its neighbors refuse to buy what they themselves can produce, such a country is blockaded. It may be able to drive a bargain with countries anxious to sell, but its bargaining power is not great. The example of England is misleading, for England as a creditor nation can buy far more than she sells and can refuse to buy from countries which exclude her exports. Japan has not this favorable position. And an attempt to bargain may appear like an attempt to intimidate.

THE STONE WALL

Now if enlightened and conscientious national governments are improbable for the reasons which I have explained, and international government is impossible, the future (the immediate future) holds nothing better in store for us than a series of makeshifts and palliatives. And it may hold far worse things in store. This unpleasant conclusion was in our minds at the close of the Banff Conference. Some delegates were—I thought rather naïvely—annoyed that they had reached so negative a result. They complained that "no constructive suggestions had been made," that "we were brought up against a stone wall," that "we had not got anywhere."

Why anyone imbued with a scientific spirit should wish to "get anywhere," I do not know. He should wish to get knowledge, or, failing that, a probability. This had been done. Besides, to have come up against a stone wall is to have got somewhere, albeit to a



bad spot. If one is in such a spot, there are four courses open: (1) One can stay there and bemoan one's fate; (2) one can try to climb over the wall; (3) one can try to get round the end; or (4) one can try to blow the wall up. Metaphorically speaking, all these courses were open to the conference, just as they are open to us. To try to climb the wall is to try to improve the quality of national governments until international cooperation is practicable. There is no harm in trying to do this. To go round corresponds to trying to constitute an international government. We can try if we like. To blow up the wall is revolutionary—to succeed you must have the explosives, and there is some danger of being hurt in the process. To wait for something to happen is a confession of powerlessness. But if one is powerless why not admit it as we do when in the natural sciences we reach the limit of our powers?

CONCLUSION

We have dealt with basic situations, and basic causes of war. It is at this point that action must be taken if it is to be effective. Of course, a great deal has been written about the danger of armaments and the dangers of war psychology. But armaments and war psychology do not arise of themselves, nor are they entirely the creations of business men who want a market for munitions. Men who see a danger and little hope of avoiding it are impelled by the most conscientious of motives to vote for armaments. Soldiers who are responsible for the action to be taken if an emergency occurs would be doing less than their duty if they did not make their plans for every contingency and press for adequate personnel and equipment. And when these claims have to be brought home to taxpayers, far more strenuous propaganda is required than is needed when the demand is for schools or old age pensions. The taxpayers have to be frightened. It is as bad as if no money could be had for a university without representing it as a bulwark against revolution and then representing that revolution was imminent. The atmosphere of alarm needed to get money, or the boasting needed to maintain morale, is of course in itself a great danger, and from it may well arise the incident which is the immediate cause of conflict. Americans from Hawaii, Japanese, and Chinese tell us of the war psychology. Something of it we can see from the Hearst papers. But to concentrate on this war psychology or on armaments as a basic cause of war is sensible only if they have continued to exist when no real justification for them remains.

Famine and poverty are tolerable things so long as their causes are seen to be inevitable, to lie in drought or flood or want of capi-



tal. They become intolerable things when it is seen — or believed — that they could be avoided if men and women could organize their lives in a cooperative way. To say that we have not yet succeeded in creating an organization of this sort and that under present conditions it is psychologically impossible to create one is true, but it is a truth which infuriates the sufferers, who instinctively, if uncritically, refuse to believe it.

It is much the same with war. War is bearable if it appears as a struggle for self-preservation. It may even give an inspiring feeling of cooperation for a common objective which makes whole-hearted cooperation psychologically possible. But war is intolerable if it is seen (or believed) to be avoidable, and if the same or better results can be reached by agreement. Now, supposing the answer is the one which has been indicated — that sensible agreements can readily be imagined but they are politically impossible — what effect will that answer have? The majority will refuse to believe it. They will insist that their governments come to agreement. But they will not relieve their governments of the political pressure which makes agreement impossible. The result is seen in make-believe agreements, in formal agreements to refrain from war without the steady mutual aid necessary to maintain peace, and as in the past we shall have the appearance of safety with no real diminution of the danger.

No "constructive suggestions" are offered. We are trying to explain a situation, to analyze a situation, to show how the very economic progress of the world has imposed tasks on human organization which cannot, at the moment, be performed. The result is to make the danger relentlessly clear. If the danger can be made clear enough to the peoples of the world they may take the necessary precautions. Psychologically one may doubt the very possibility of making the danger so clear as to drive people to either of the two safe courses: the creation of enlightened governments, which can disregard political pressures and place world interest before national interest, or the creation of a world government. We may realize too clearly how easy it is to shut one's eyes to disagreeable facts to think that peoples will never go to war again. And to put my conclusion bluntly, the Pacific may be the scene of a war for which no one nation will be entitled to disclaim its share of responsibility.





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